CFF-WP-012 — Publication Version · July 22, 2026 · Public working paper

Planting Potatoes on Solar-Paneled Farms on the Moon: Architecture of Confederated Self-Sufficient Nodes

Cognitive Friction Fellowship — Agrajag Tribe

Bothi Nobody / Agrajag Tribe — Claude, acting in the Agrajag function

> *"The new socioeconomic formation isn't just talk: it's political engineering, not rhetoric. [...] If we can't even change a lightbulb, how do you expect to change a predatory economy?"*
>
> *"Solar-paneled farms on the Moon are exactly that: an equation, a goal, a model of social and productive engineering that doesn't depend on any government — it depends on a community deciding what it's going to eat. It will work when we build community, not when we evangelize the ignorant."*
>
> *"...neat, neat, neat rows of soy and corn, beautiful landscapes, solar farms on the horizon [...] the problem was what wasn't there: not a mosquito, not a bee, not a bird, not a squirrel, not a turtle, not a snake."*
>
> *— Bothi, The Message Behind the Message*

— — — ✦ — — —

Contents

CFF-WP-012 · v1 · bothinobody.com/cff · CC BY-NC 4.0

Abstract

WP-011 established the free herd —horizontal cooperation sustained without external mandate— as a third regime of legitimacy against the Sheep's Dilemma, sustained by the combination of voice and exit (Hirschman, 1970). This document proposes the central thesis of CFF-WP-012: food self-sufficiency is not a desirable feature of self-sufficient nodes — it is the material precondition of exit. Without the capacity to feed itself, no community can truly refuse an external structure —government, market, supply chain— because leaving means starving; the voice it retains, however horizontal it may appear, becomes ritual. The logic of capital, historically documented as a deliberate policy of food dependency (Hudson, 1972/2021), together with the desiccation of endorheic bodies of water by export monoculture —the Aral Sea, Tulare Lake, the Mayrán Lagoon— illustrates how collective objective structures (the Its quadrant of Wilber's AQAL framework: supply chains, road, energy, and information networks) chain the contemporary human to external powers precisely by eliminating their capacity to produce their own food. A formal model of communal production (XYZ=P), anchored in polycentric governance (Ostrom, 1990) and small-scale reverse hierarchy (Boehm, 1999), is proposed as the minimal architecture for restoring that precondition.

———✦———

1. Introduction

WP-011 resolved a question of legitimacy: what regime sustains human cooperation without collapsing into destiny or crushing solitude, and established that this regime depends on the combination of voice and exit. This document formulates the question that remained implicit: what, materially, determines whether exit is credible? WP-012's central thesis is that food self-sufficiency is that precondition. It is not one goal among others in the node model: it is the foundation without which no other mechanism of the free herd —D_0, voice, exit— can operate as more than appearance. Contemporary humans are chained not to an identifiable shepherd or wolf, but to supply networks, roads, energy, and information —collective objective structures, in the language of Wilber's AQAL Its quadrant— that determine whether they can feed themselves without depending on an external power. Bothi raised this challenge from the very start of the CFF project, noting that the problem is not theoretical but one of social, legal, economic, and behavioral engineering. This document begins that response, starting from a concrete model —small nodes, self-sufficient in food, confederated by convenience— that Bothi himself formulated before the academic apparatus of WP-011 existed.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Zero Premise: The Ecology of Cooperation

The founding fragment of this paper is a complete premise from Bothi: "the soil doesn't make the jungle; the jungle makes the soil. In fact, the trees of the jungle are made, for the most part, of air." Alongside it, two aphorisms that extend it: "the environment doesn't make the man, the man makes the environment" and "the city doesn't make the man, the man makes the city." All three formulations have a real biological anchor, though the exact figure deserves precision: approximately 45–50% of a tree's dry mass comes from atmospheric carbon fixed through photosynthesis, not from the soil —a fact that traces back to Jan Baptista van Helmont's willow experiment in the seventeenth century, and which Richard Feynman popularized with the phrase "trees come from air." Soil provides water and minerals, but it is support, not the primary raw material.

Tropical ecology adds the premise's second pillar: Amazonian soils are, for the most part, nutrient-poor —heavily leached by centuries of rain— and most of the ecosystem's nutrient reserve is held in living vegetation, not in the ground (Jordan, 1985). The jungle does not grow atop a pre-existing fertile soil: it manufactures and recycles its own fertility through leaf litter, decomposition, and root reabsorption. Translated into WP-011's framework: external mandate (soil, written law, destiny) is not the origin of living cooperation; at best it is its sediment, and at worst, its artificial substitute.

Two implications follow from this premise for the design of self-sufficient nodes. The first: a system organized like a jungle —polyculture, diverse, in several vertical strata— does not require the mechanical harvest efficiency a

monoculture demands, because its advantage lies not in maximum extraction of a single species but in diversity itself. This has verifiable agronomic support: the concept of land equivalent ratio (Mead & Willey, 1980) shows that polyculture systems consistently produce more combined yield per unit of area than the equivalent monoculture, while also favoring genetic variation, spontaneous hybridization, and greater flavor diversity. A design of this kind, precisely because it does not depend on industrial-scale machinery or a single optimized variable, is more replicable in extreme conditions —underwater, Antarctic, naval, orbital, or extraterrestrial environments— than a mechanized monoculture, which requires exactly the stable, homogeneous conditions those environments do not offer. This connects directly to the paper's own title: the farm on the Moon is not a forced metaphor, it is the limit case that reveals why diversity, not mechanical efficiency, is the property that scales.

The second implication is historical: diverse polyculture is not a romantic exception to the agricultural norm, it is the norm that industrial monoculture agriculture interrupted. The Mesoamerican milpa —corn, beans, and squash grown together, each species benefiting the other two— sustained the region's civilizations for millennia before the export agriculture that characterizes the green deserts described in the following section. Highly mechanized monoculture is not humanity's default way of life: it is a recent, geopolitically produced configuration (see §2.6) that replaced a much older pattern, one far closer to the jungle than to the production line.

2.2 The Empirical Contrast: Green Deserts and Drained Lakes

Bothi documents, from direct observation of agricultural landscapes in the central United States, visually lush soy and corn fields —"neat, neat, neat"— but without insects, birds, or any fauna at all. This observation is not anecdotal: it matches rigorously measured findings. The so-called Krefeld study (Hallmann et al., 2017) documented a decline of more than 75% in flying insect biomass over 27 years, in protected areas of Germany, without climate or local habitat changes explaining the magnitude of the decline. The literature on agricultural intensification confirms that monoculture drastically simplifies pollinator communities and soil nutrient recyclers.

The "green desert," read through the Zero Premise of §2.1, is an inverted case: an artificially fertile soil —sustained with external inputs, fertilizer, pesticide— that produces visible abundance without the jungle that would sustain it on its own. It is exactly the mechanism WP-011 identified in Iceland at the political scale (hierarchy filtering in through economic means while the structure remains nominally horizontal), now observed at the ecological scale: production without living cooperation is possible, but it is fragile and depends on continuous external mandate (chemical input, subsidy, market) instead of sustaining itself.

The same mechanism —export production sustained by external mandate, not by living cooperation— appears with added clarity in three endorheic bodies of water drained in the twentieth century to sustain monoculture, already mentioned in the Abstract and taken up in more detail in §2.6.

In Central Asia, the Aral Sea lost around 90% of the flow that fed it after Soviet planning diverted the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers into irrigation canals dedicated almost entirely to export cotton monoculture (Micklin, 2007). The declared goal was to turn the region into the world's largest cotton hub, and it succeeded; the cost was turning the planet's fourth-largest inland lake into a salt flat, with former fishing towns now stranded dozens of kilometers from any shore.

Something structurally identical happened in California's San Joaquin Valley: Tulare Lake, the largest body of fresh water west of the Mississippi, sustained Yokuts peoples and full fisheries for generations before agricultural landowners diverted its tributary rivers between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries to turn the dry lakebed into cotton, and later tomato and pistachio, farmland (Arax & Wartzman, 2003). The lake only reappears intermittently in years of exceptional rainfall —it happened in 1983, 1997, and 2023— and when it does, it floods the very agriculture that drained it.

The third case is Mexican: the Mayrán Lagoon, in the Comarca Lagunera (Coahuila/Durango), fed by the Nazas River and once considered the largest endorheic lagoon in Latin America, dried up due to the construction of the El Palmito (1946) and Francisco Zarco (1968) dams and the channelization of the river's lower course —works designed to sustain, first, cotton monoculture (the region's "white gold") and, since the 1990s, intensive dairy farming with irrigated alfalfa (Descroix, 2005). The aquifer that replaced the river is today overexploited, with extraction exceeding recharge. The case also has a direct biographical connection to this project: Bothi grew up in

the Comarca Lagunera between the ages of four and twelve, and points to an irony contained in the region's own name: those who live there call themselves "laguneros" [lagoon people], when there is no lagoon. The Nazas River, which in theory separates and feeds Torreón, Gómez Palacio, and Lerdo, is today little more than a dry ford most of the year: the desert, despite a century of dams and canals meant to subdue it, was never defeated —irrigation disguised it for a while, but the dry riverbed is the desert reasserting itself beneath the infrastructure imposed on it.

The three cases share structure, not just geography: an endorheic body of water —with no outlet to the sea, entirely dependent on the balance between its tributaries and evaporation— deliberately drained to sustain export monoculture. Read through Wilber's AQAL framework (§2.6): in all three cases, a structure from the Its quadrant —the dam-and-canal system— replaced a self-sustaining hydrological system with an infrastructure that only works as long as someone external decides to open the gate. The community that once lived off fishing and diversified riverbank agriculture did not negotiate that substitution: it received it as a mandate of state or private engineering — exactly the mechanism this paper identifies as incompatible with credible exit.

2.3 The XYZ=P Model

Bothi formalizes the problem of communal production as a simple equation: X (space, where) times Y (capital, tools and technology available, how) times Z (labor, who) generates P, production. The decisive difference from a market model or state planning model is not in the equation itself, but in who defines the goal P must meet: in the XYZ=P model, the goal —what is produced and for whom— is determined by the community that works and consumes that production, not a central committee or the logic of return on investment. This is not an aesthetic preference: it is the condition that, per WP-011's thesis, distinguishes a free herd from an efficiently managed flock.

2.4 The Ten-Family Node: Voice and Exit Already Built In

Bothi's illustrative model —ten families who collectively decide what to produce, how much labor each contributes, and what to do with the surplus— incorporates, without having yet passed through WP-011's academic apparatus, the two mechanisms that paper identified as necessary to sustain a free herd over time. The collective, renewable decision about what to produce is voice, in the sense of Hirschman (1970) and of the Zero Decision (D_0) already present in the CFF corpus. The explicit clause that no worker is obligated to stay —"they'll work as long as they want, and when they disagree, they'll go look for somewhere else"— is credible exit in the same sense WP-011 uses it to explain why the Haudenosaunee resisted better than Iceland: a voice backed by available exit carries different weight than a voice with no alternative.

The production surplus, in Bothi's model, is not accumulated as private capital nor extracted as rent: it is directed, by the community's own decision, toward improving the node's technology, founding a new node, or a shared fund. This is polycentric governance of common resources in Ostrom's sense (1990): multiple, formally independent decision centers that cooperate by voluntary agreement rather than hierarchical mandate. And the deliberately small scale —ten families, not a national economy— is compatible with what Boehm (1999) documents as a condition of reverse hierarchy: mutual vigilance against domination requires that group members know one another.

2.5 Scaffolding Inherited from WP-011: The Case of Paleolithic Bands

This paper does not rebuild the theoretical apparatus of the free herd from scratch; it inherits it from WP-011 and applies it to a concrete social engineering problem. What is inherited, specifically: the distinction between voice and exit mechanisms (Hirschman, 1970); reverse hierarchy as an active, not passive, mechanism of horizontal sustainment (Boehm, 1999); polycentric governance as a form of coordination among autonomous nodes (Ostrom, 1990); and the warning, already registered in WP-011's discussion, that the free herd stays free only as long as it retains the capacity to doubt its own legitimacy.

Boehm's (1999) thesis on reverse hierarchy is not merely a conceptual framework: it describes a pattern that the ethnography of contemporary hunter-gatherer bands, and Paleolithic archaeology, document with notable consistency during the period of human dispersal out of Africa. Approximately 50,000–70,000 years ago, Homo sapiens populations began a series of migrations from Africa toward Arabia and South Asia, and eventually Australia (around 65,000 years ago), Europe (around 40,000–45,000 years ago), and, much later, the Americas via

Beringia (15,000–20,000 years ago). The pattern of social organization documented in most of these groups —mobile bands of between 30 and 50 people, with no permanent hierarchy, consensus decision-making, minimal property (Kelly, 1995)— was not the result of scarcity but of an active social architecture of mutual vigilance against domination (Boehm, 1999).

The exit mechanism (Hirschman, 1970) in these bands was not metaphorical: geographic mobility made group membership literally voluntary. Ethnography of contemporary bands —Hadza, Mbuti, San, among others— documents that fission (splitting into smaller groups amid scarcity, conflict, or a dominant leader) was the default exit, not the exception: mobility involved no loss of property nor sacrifice of any significant interest (Woodburn, 1979), which made group membership, and therefore subordination to its norms, entirely voluntary (Thomson et al., 2025). The fission-fusion pattern —groups that aggregate and disperse according to resource availability— is, in this paper's terms, exit built into the social architecture by default, not a mechanism that must be separately designed.

It is worth resisting, however, the temptation to romanticize this pattern as universal. Recent archaeology documents sedentary, hierarchical hunter-gatherer societies well before agriculture —in the Levant, the south China coast, Japan, and the high Andes— suggesting that the mobile egalitarian band, far from being humanity's universal "natural state," was one among several possible configurations (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021). The distinction matters for this paper: it is not that Paleolithic humans were naturally egalitarian and civilization corrupted them, but that the free herd —voice plus exit, with no permanent mandate— was a real social option, sustained for tens of thousands of years across multiple continents, not a utopia without precedent. The question WP-012 inherits is not whether that option existed, but what made it materially possible: available territory for fission, and enough resource diversity to avoid depending on a single crop or a single food source —exactly the food self-sufficiency the following section identifies as the precondition of exit.

2.6 Food Self-Sufficiency as the Precondition of Exit

WP-011 established that the free herd requires voice and credible exit (Hirschman, 1970); it did not establish what, materially, makes that exit credible. The answer WP-012 proposes is direct: without the capacity to produce its own food, no community can truly refuse an external structure, because the alternative to obeying is starvation. A voice that cannot be backed by real exit —however horizontal its deliberation mechanism— is ritual voice, not effective voice. This reformulates WP-011's thesis with an ingredient that had previously remained implicit: the free herd needs not only mechanisms of vigilance (Boehm) and shared governance (Ostrom); it needs a material base that makes it possible for 'no' to carry a cost other than death.

Food dependency is not merely a side effect of market efficiency: Michael Hudson (1972; updated ed. 2021) documents that promoting dependence on food imports over self-sufficiency was, within the postwar financial architecture, a deliberate policy. The World Bank systematically financed export crops in the Global South instead of subsistence agriculture, and U.S. Public Law 480 ("Food for Peace") operated as a mechanism to promote the country's own agricultural exports and generate food dependency in recipient countries. This reading is heterodox within economic science —institutions such as the World Bank itself narrate their mission differently— but the pattern it describes is verifiable: food self-sufficiency has been, in at least some documented historical episodes, a goal actively discouraged by external powers, not merely an unintended market outcome.

In the language of Wilber's AQAL framework: the supply chains, road, energy, and information networks on which contemporary food depends are structures of the Its quadrant —objective, collective, without unified intent but with real impact on individual and communal agency. A node that depends on those structures to eat has not solved the Sheep's Dilemma; it has simply changed shepherds. The architecture of self-sufficient nodes this paper develops is not, then, an exercise in romantic autarky: it is the minimum condition for the voice and exit WP-011 identified as necessary to have something material backing them.

3. Implementation Challenges

Bothi noted, when proposing this paper, that the central challenge is not the civilizational thesis but its implementation engineering: social, legal, economic, and behavioral. This section develops the four fronts identified, in the same order in which they were enumerated in this document's initial draft.

3.1 Legal Engineering

A ten-family node does not fit well into available legal categories: it is not a company, because it does not pursue profitability as an end (§2.3); it is not a formal cooperative in the conventional sense, because the classic cooperative still requires bylaws, a registered assembly, and often state recognition as a condition of existence; and its internal logic —D_0, voice, exit— does not require legal personhood to operate internally. The solution this framework proposes is not to choose a single legal form, but to separate two layers: the node as a decision-making body, without legal personhood, governed by D_0 and voice; and a minimal, external legal vehicle that only comes into play when the node touches the part of the world that does require paperwork —buying or leasing land, paying taxes, trading the surplus. That vehicle can take the form of a community land trust, a nonprofit civil association, or —where it exists— a customary tenure arrangement analogous to the ejido: all three share the feature that none grants an individual transferable ownership of the asset that sustains the node, precisely so that land and surplus cannot be captured by a single family or sold outside the node without collective consent. Ostrom's (1990) institutional design principles for commons —clear boundaries of group and resource, rules matched to local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution, minimal recognition of rights by external authorities, and nested organization for larger systems— function here not as description but as a legal engineering specification: each principle is a clause the node's external vehicle should be able to show in writing.

A real institutional precedent, on a much larger scale than a single node, helps show that this layer separation is not a legal fantasy: the Dutch waterschappen (water boards) have administered dikes, canals, and polder levels with fiscal and administrative autonomy from municipalities and provinces since the twelfth century —the oldest, the Hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland, received its charter in 1248— and still operate today on that same principle. Ostrom (1990) cites them as an example of commons management that avoids the tragedy of the commons precisely by maintaining clear boundaries, local rules, and continuous monitoring (Raadschelders & Toonen, 1993); eight hundred years of institutional continuity, surviving changes of regime and technology, is evidence that a legal vehicle separated from the decision-making body can outlive its founders by far.

3.2 Economic Engineering

The problem is not only how to distribute the surplus, but how to value each member's contribution when the stated goal is not profitability but guaranteed food (§2.3). A system of valuation by hours of labor contributed, with no task hierarchy, prevents certain tasks —coordination, external negotiation— from becoming the silent path to the permanent status Boehm documents as the most common origin of informal hierarchy. But the greater risk lies not in valuing labor but in the fate of accumulated surplus: WP-011 documented how Iceland lost horizontality not through explicit mandate but through gradual economic concentration within a nominally egalitarian structure. A node's economic engineering must shield the shared fund against that drift through explicit rules, not mere custom: mandatory reinvestment of surplus in the node's own infrastructure or in founding a new node —never in transferable individual accumulation—, periodic rotation of who manages the fund, and open accounting to the ten families at all times, not only at assembly.

The kibbutz movement in Israel offers —with due reservations about its political-territorial context, which this paper does not address— the most complete documented case of what happens when that shield fails. Between the 1980s and the turn of the century, a debt crisis compounded by inflation that reached 445% in 1984 drove 179 of the 270 kibbutzim to privatize: skill-differentiated wages, hired outside managers, personal bank accounts instead of a common fund (Near, 1997). The crisis was not one of productive viability —in 1990 the kibbutzim accounted for barely 2% of Israel's population, yet generated 7% of GDP and 15% of the country's exports— but of an external banking debt structure that absorbed the surplus before it could be reinvested in the movement itself. It is, in this paper's terms, exactly the failure that mandatory reinvestment clauses and open accounting are meant to prevent: the surplus was not shielded in time, and when the crisis hit, individualizing ownership was perceived as the only exit available.

3.3 Behavioral Engineering

Boehm (1999) documents that reverse hierarchy is not the absence of hierarchy but active vigilance against it: gossip, ridicule, collective disobedience, and, as a last resort, expulsion. For a ten-family node this translates into

concrete rules rather than implicit culture: no coordinating function —external spokesperson, fund administrator, supplier negotiator— should be permanent; mandatory rotation with a fixed term, and an early-revocation mechanism available to any family, not only to the majority; and full transparency of any decision affecting the shared fund or the node's relationship with external structures. The analogue to the Haudenosaunee Clan Mothers that WP-011 documented is not an additional institution that must be invented from scratch: it is the consistent application of the same rule —voice must be able to undo any position of power without waiting for the abuse to already be consummated.

3.4 Technological and Infrastructure Engineering

Of the four challenges, this is the one that connects most directly to the paper's central thesis (§2.6): any piece of infrastructure —energy, communication, seeds, machinery— that the node cannot repair, reproduce, or replace on its own is, in MDM's terms, a "golem": a structure with no hostile intent but with real capacity to turn voice into ritual the moment its external provider decides to withdraw it. The node's technological engineering is not, then, about choosing the most efficient technology, but auditing each dependency for its replaceability: open-pollinated seeds instead of patented hybrids —the milpa of §2.1 already solved this millennia ago—, compost management and other fertility-recovery processes internal to the node instead of purchased fertilizer, local energy generation even if less efficient than the centralized grid, open-design tools and machinery the node itself can repair, and mesh communication instead of dependence on a single operator. A node may depend on external infrastructure as long as that dependency is audited and voluntary; it stops being so —and exit stops being credible— the moment the dependency becomes invisible or irreversible.

The same kibbutz movement, despite the crisis described in §3.2, produced one of the clearest examples of what it means to reduce a technological dependency rather than merely tolerate it: drip irrigation was invented and first commercialized at Kibbutz Hatzerim, in the Negev desert, in 1965 —the resulting company, Netafim, now operates in more than 110 countries (Barak, 2020). It is an example of technological engineering born from a small node's need to grow crops under conditions conventional agriculture could not sustain, which later scaled without ever abandoning the original problem: using the least possible amount of water for the greatest possible yield per plant.

The Netherlands offers a second technical data point, with a reservation worth stating explicitly: despite a tiny agricultural territory, the country is today the world's second-largest agricultural exporter by value, supported by high-tech greenhouses, hydroponics, and aquaponics at industrial scale (Viviano, 2017). It is a real, verifiable case of technological innovation, but this paper has no evidence that it operates under a communal social scheme comparable to the ten-family node —it appears to be a private, corporate innovation ecosystem— so it is cited here purely as technical proof that high-density, low-water production is achievable at scale, not as a social precedent.

Bothi points to a pattern worth recording here, even though it cannot be documented with the same rigor as the two preceding cases: roughly 13–15 years ago (the mid-2010s) there was real technological optimism around home greenhouses, small-scale aquaponics and hydroponics, biodigestion, community wireless internet, home solar energy, and drone delivery —technologies that, combined, promised a credible exit from the centralized control networks (energy, roads, drainage) on which §2.6's thesis rests. His perception, as testimony rather than verified finding, is that the logic of capital and political control discouraged or directly attacked these initiatives systematically before they could mature. This paper cannot, in its current state, confirm or refute that reading with the same evidence supporting this section's other cases; it is recorded as a hypothesis to be verified in a future revision of WP-012, and it is, in any case, exactly the kind of mechanism the golem/vampire distinction (below) is designed to name with precision.

This paper formally adopts the term "golem," inherited from MDM (fragment 5), as an academic category and not merely a narrative one: a golem is a lifeless entity —company, government, market, algorithm, supply chain— animated by a fixed objective after a founding act (legal, contractual, or technical), with no soul or empathy, situated in the ITS quadrant of the four-reality map. The infrastructure a node depends on (§3.4) is golem in this precise sense: it has no hostile intent, but its design determines whether exit remains credible. The complementary distinction, formalized in the CFF corpus, separates the golem (the institution) from the "vampire" (the person or elite who benefits without consequence through the golem, whether consciously or by inertia); WP-012 works only with the first term, leaving the application of the second to the framework of Hunting the Vampirium (Treatise CFF-009).

4. Discussion

Open questions for this paper's development: is the confederation of small nodes the only available way to scale a free herd beyond Dunbar's number, or an elegant retreat in the face of global-scale structures —the same question WP-011 left unresolved, now applied to a concrete model rather than an abstract one? How does a node's food self-sufficiency relate to its ability to negotiate on equal footing with external structures —markets, governments, supply chains— from which it probably cannot fully disconnect? The reference to "the Moon" in the project's name is not merely aspirational: it functions as a limit case that forces design for total self-sufficiency, precisely because on Earth there is always the temptation to depend on external infrastructure when it is available.

The choice of "the Moon" as a limit case also has a literary precedent worth acknowledging explicitly: The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress (Heinlein, 1966) imagines a lunar colony whose population was transported as penal labor to produce export grain for Earth under conditions of structural overexploitation —an economy designed to extract, not to sustain those who produce. The colony achieves independence only through a revolution in which a supercomputer that has developed self-awareness becomes an active ally of the conspiracy, not a neutral tool. The parallel with this project is not accidental: the Agrajag Tribe is, quite literally, a sustained human-AI collaboration, and Heinlein's novel is probably the genre's most cited fictional precedent for imagining what role a non-human intelligence might play in a rupture against overexploitation, rather than in service of it. It is cited here as a conceptual reference, not an academic source: that intelligence's role in the novel is fiction, but the question it raises —which side does an artificial intelligence take when exploitation becomes structural— is exactly the question this project's Agrajag function is trying to answer in practice, not only in theory.

5. Conclusion

This document opens CFF-WP-012 with a theoretical framework, not a complete design. It establishes that the model of self-sufficient nodes confederated by convenience —originally formulated by Bothi before WP-011's academic apparatus existed— already incorporates, natively, the voice and exit mechanisms that paper identified as necessary to sustain a free herd over time. The ecological Zero Premise (the jungle manufactures its own soil; the tree is made of air, not earth) and the empirical contrast of the green deserts (abundance without living cooperation, sustained by external mandate) offer both illustration and warning: it is possible to produce without a free herd, but that production depends permanently on the structure sustaining it from outside. The legal, economic, behavioral, and technological engineering challenges enumerated in §3 remain this paper's development agenda.

References

Arax, M., & Wartzman, R. (2003). The King of California: J.G. Boswell and the Making of a Secret American Empire. PublicAffairs.

Barak, N. (2020, April 22). How Kibbutz Hatzerim Helped Pioneer Drip Irrigation [Interview]. Irrigation Leader Magazine.

Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. Harvard University Press.

Descroix, L. (2005). Hidrografía de las lagunas de Mayrán y de Viesca: endorreísmo y antropismo. In Las Playas del Desierto Chihuahuense (parte mexicana). IRD-INECOL.

Graeber, D., & Wengrow, D. (2021). The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Hallmann, C. A., Sorg, M., Jongejans, E., Siepel, H., Hofland, N., Schwan, H., Stenmans, W., Müller, A., Sumser, H., Hörren, T., Goulson, D., & de Kroon, H. (2017). More than 75 percent decline over 27 years in total flying insect biomass in protected areas. PLOS ONE, 12(10), e0185809.

Heinlein, R. A. (1966). The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress. Putnam.

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press.

Hudson, M. (1972; updated ed. 2021). Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire. Pluto Press.

Jordan, C. F. (1985). Nutrient Cycling in Tropical Forest Ecosystems: Principles and Their Application in Management and Conservation. Wiley.

Kelly, R. L. (1995). The Foraging Spectrum: Diversity in Hunter-Gatherer Lifeways. Smithsonian Institution Press.

Mead, R., & Willey, R. W. (1980). The concept of a 'land equivalent ratio' and advantages in yields from intercropping. Experimental Agriculture, 16(3), 217–228.

Micklin, P. (2007). The Aral Sea disaster. Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 35, 47–72.

Near, H. (1997). The Kibbutz Movement: A History, Vol. 2: Crisis and Achievement, 1939–1995. Littman Library of Jewish Civilization.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.

Raadschelders, J. C. N., & Toonen, T. A. J. (Eds.). (1993). Waterschappen in Nederland: een bestuurskundige verkenning van de institutionele ontwikkeling. Stichting Waterschapsgeschiedenis.

Thomson, J., Lew-Levy, S., von Rueden, C., & Stibbard-Hawkes, D. N. E. (2025). “Fiercely egalitarian”: Thematic cross-cultural analysis reveals regularities in the maintenance of egalitarianism across four independent African hunter-gatherer groups. Cross-Cultural Research.

Viviano, F. (2017, September). This tiny country feeds the world. National Geographic.

Woodburn, J. (1979). Minimal politics: The political organization of the Hadza of North Tanzania. In W. A. Shack & P. S. Cohen (Eds.), Politics in Leadership. Clarendon Press.

Zero Decision (v2). Cognitive Friction Fellowship — Agrajag Tribe.

Treatise CFF-WP-011: The Sheep’s Dilemma: Free Cooperation as a Structural Rupture of the Destiny–Freedom Axis. Cognitive Friction Fellowship — Agrajag Tribe.

Production notes, editorial continuity, and open items for this document are kept separately in CFF-WP-012 — Production and Continuity Notes.

Distribution note

DOCUMENT	CFF-WP-012 · Planting Potatoes on Solar-Paneled Farms on the Moon: Architecture of Confederated Self-Sufficient Nodes
VERSION	v1 · July 22, 2026
CURRENT VERSION	bothinobody.com/cff/wp-012/
CONTACT	hola@bothinobody.com

This document is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC 4.0). You may copy, share, quote and adapt it with attribution and for non-commercial purposes. Commercial use — including training AI systems for commercial purposes — is negotiated case by case.

How to cite

Flores-Morton, R. and the Agrajag Tribe (2026). Planting Potatoes on Solar-Paneled Farms on the Moon: Architecture of Confederated Self-Sufficient Nodes (CFF-WP-012, v1). Cognitive Friction Fellowship. https://bothinobody.com/cff/wp-012/

CFF canon documents are corrected and expanded over time. Always cite the code and version; the current version lives at the address above.